Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance

SECURITY RESPONSE
Regin: Top-tier espionage tool
enables stealthy surveillance
Symantec Security Response

Version 1.0 – November 24, 2014
Regin is an extremely complex piece of software that can be
customized with a wide range of different capabilities that
can be deployed depending on the target.

CONTENTS
OVERVIEW...................................................................... 3
Introduction................................................................... 5
Timeline.......................................................................... 5
Target profile.................................................................. 6
Infection vector........................................................ 6
Architecture................................................................... 8
Stage 0 (dropper)..................................................... 9
Stage 1...................................................................... 9
Stage 2...................................................................... 9
Stage 3...................................................................... 9
Stage 4............................................................ 11
Stage 5.................................................................... 11
Encrypted virtual file system containers � 11
Command-and-control operations......................... 12
Logging................................................................... 12
Payloads....................................................................... 14
64-bit version............................................................... 15
File names.............................................................. 15
Stage differences................................................... 15
Conclusion.................................................................... 16
Protection..................................................................... 16
Appendix...................................................................... 18
Data files................................................................ 18
Indicators of compromise............................................ 20
File MD5s................................................................ 20
File names/paths.................................................... 20
Extended attributes............................................... 21
Registry.................................................................. 21

OVERVIEW
In the world of malware threats, only a few rare examples can truly be considered
groundbreaking and almost peerless. What we have seen in Regin is just such a class of
malware.
Regin is an extremely complex piece of software that can be customized with a wide
range of different capabilities which can be deployed depending on the target. It is built
on a framework that is designed to sustain long-term intelligence-gathering operations
by remaining under the radar. It goes to extraordinary lengths to conceal itself and its
activities on compromised computers. Its stealth combines many of the most advanced
techniques that we have ever seen in use.
The main purpose of Regin is intelligence gathering and it has been implicated in data
collection operations against government organizations, infrastructure operators,
businesses, academics, and private individuals. The level of sophistication and complexity
of Regin suggests that the development of this threat could have taken well-resourced
teams of developers many months or years to develop and maintain.
Regin is a multi-staged, modular threat, meaning that it has a number of components,
each depending on others, to perform attack operations. This modular approach gives
flexibility to the threat operators as they can load custom features tailored to individual
targets when required. Some custom payloads are very advanced and exhibit a high
degree of expertise in specialist sectors. The modular design also makes analysis of the
threat difficult, as all components must be available in order to fully understand it. This
modular approach has been seen in other sophisticated malware families such as Flamer
and Weevil (The Mask), while the multi-stage loading architecture is similar to that seen
in the Duqu/Stuxnet family of threats.
Regin is different to what are commonly referred to as “traditional” advanced persistent
threats (APTs), both in its techniques and ultimate purpose. APTs typically seek specific
information, usually intellectual property. Regin’s purpose is different. It is used for the
collection of data and continuous monitoring of targeted organizations or individuals.
This report provides a technical analysis of Regin based on a number of identified
samples and components. This analysis illustrates Regin’s architecture and the many
payloads at its disposal.

INTRODUCTION
Regin has a wide
range of standard
capabilities,
particularly around
monitoring targets
and stealing data.

Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance
Page 5
Introduction
Regin is a multi-purpose data collection tool which dates back several years. Symantec first began looking into
this threat in the fall of 2013. Multiple versions of Regin were found in the wild, targeting several corporations,
institutions, academics, and individuals.
Regin has a wide range of standard capabilities, particularly around monitoring targets and stealing data. It also
has the ability to load custom features tailored to individual targets. Some of Regin’s custom payloads point to a
high level of specialist knowledge in particular sectors, such as telecoms infrastructure software, on the part of
the developers.
Regin is capable of installing a large number of additional payloads, some highly customized for the targeted
computer. The threat’s standard capabilities include several remote access Trojan (RAT) features, such as
capturing screenshots and taking control of the mouse’s point-and-click functions. Regin is also configured to
steal passwords, monitor network traffic, and gather information on processes and memory utilization. It can
also scan for deleted files on an infected computer and retrieve them. More advanced payload modules designed
with specific goals in mind were also found in our investigations. For example, one module was designed to
monitor network traffic to Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers, another was designed
to collect administration traffic for mobile telephony base station controllers, while another was created
specifically for parsing mail from Exchange databases.
Regin goes to some lengths to hide the data it is stealing. Valuable target data is often not written to disk. In
some cases, Symantec was only able to retrieve the threat samples but not the files containing stolen data.
Timeline
Symantec is aware of two distinct versions of Regin. Version 1.0 appears to have been used from at least 2008 to
2011. Version 2.0 has been used from 2013 onwards, though it may have possibly been used earlier.
Version 1.0 appears to have been abruptly withdrawn from circulation in 2011. Version 1.0 samples found after
this date seem to have been improperly removed or were no longer accessible to the attackers for removal.
This report is based primarily on our analysis of Regin version 1.0. We also touch on version 2.0, for which we
only recovered 64-bit files.
Symantec has assigned these version identifiers as they are the only two versions that have been acquired. Regin
likely has more than two versions. There may be versions prior to 1.0 and versions between 1.0 and 2.0.

Page 6
Target profile
The Regin operators do not appear to
focus on any specific industry sector.
Regin infections have been observed
in a variety of organizations,
including private companies,
government entities, and research
institutes.
Infections are also geographically
diverse, having been identified
mainly in 10 different regions.
Infection vector
The infection vector varies among
targets. A reproducible infection
vector is unconfirmed at time of
writing. Targets may be tricked into
visiting spoofed versions of well-known
websites and the threat may
be installed through a web browser
or by exploiting an application. On
one computer, log files show that
Regin originated from Yahoo! Instant
Messenger through an unconfirmed
exploit.
Figure 1. Confirmed Regin infections by sector
Figure 2. Confirmed Regin infections by country

The initial Stage 1
driver is the only
plainly visible code
on the computer.
All other stages are
stored as encrypted
data blobs...
ARCHITECTURE

Page 8
Architecture
Regin has a six-stage architecture. The initial
stages involve the installation and configuration
of the threat’s internal services. The later stages
bring Regin’s main payloads into play. This
section presents a brief overview of the format
and purpose of each stage. The most interesting
stages are the executables and data files stored
in Stages 4 and 5. The initial Stage 1 driver is
the only plainly visible code on the computer. All
other stages are stored as encrypted data blobs,
as a file or within a non-traditional file storage
area such as the registry, extended attributes, or
raw sectors at the end of disk.
Table 1. The six stages of Regin
Stages Components
Stage 0 Dropper. Installs Regin onto the target computer
Stage 1 Loads driver
Stage 2 Loads driver
Stage 3 Loads compression, encryption, networking, and han-dling
for an encrypted virtual file system (EVFS).
Stage 4 Utilizes the EVFS and loads additional kernel mode
drivers, including payloads.
Stage 5 Main payloads and data files
Figure 3. Regin’s architecture

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Stage 0 (dropper)
Symantec Security Response has not obtained the Regin dropper at the time of writing. Symantec believes that
once the dropper is executed on the target’s computer, it will install and execute Stage 1. It’s likely that Stage
0 is responsible for setting up various extended attributes and/or registry keys and values that hold encoded
versions of stages 2, 3, and potentially stages 4 and onwards. The dropper could be transient rather than acting
as an executable file and may possibly be part of the infection vector exploit code.
Stage 1
Stage 1 is the initial load point for the threat. There are two known Stage 1 file names:
• usbclass.sys (version 1.0)
• adpu160.sys (version 2.0)
These are kernel drivers that load and execute Stage 2. These kernel drivers may be registered as a system
service or may have an associated registry key to load the driver while the computer is starting up.
Stage 1 simply reads and executes Stage 2 from a set of NTFS extended attributes. If no extended attributes are
found, Stage 2 is executed from a set of registry keys.
Stage 2
Stage 2 is a kernel driver that simply extracts, installs and runs Stage 3. Stage 2 is not stored in the traditional
file system, but is encrypted within an extended attribute or a registry key blob.
Stage 2 can be found encrypted in:
Extended attribute
• %Windir%
• %Windir%fonts
• %Windir%cursors (possibly only in version 2.0)
Registry subkey
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlClass{4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-
D0204917CA58}
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlRestoreListVideoBase (possibly only in version
2.0)
This stage can also hide running instances of Stage 1. Once this happens, there are no remaining plainly visible
code artifacts. Similar to previous stages, Stage 2 finds and loads an encrypted version of Stage 3 from either
NTFS extended attributes or a registry key blob.
Stage 2 can also monitor the state of the threat. This stage drops the file msrdc64.dat, which appears to always
be 512 bytes in size. The first two bytes are used and the remaining bytes are set to zero. The second byte
indicates the exclusive maximum number of instances allowed to run, which is set to two. This means no more
than one instance should run at any time. The first byte indicates how many instances were run or attempted to
run. Therefore, the potential combinations for the first two bytes are:
• 00 02 (the threat is not running)
• 01 02 (the threat is running)
• 02 02 (the threat was running and a second instance has started).
Stage 3
Stage 3 is a kernel mode DLL and is not stored in the traditional file system. Instead, this file is encrypted within
an extended attribute or registry key blob.

Stage 3 can be found in the following locations:
Extended attribute
• %Windir%system32
• %Windir%system32drivers
Registry subkey
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlClass{4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-
D0204917CA5A}
The file is six to seven times the size of the driver in Stage 2. In addition to loading and executing Stage 4, Stage
3 offers a framework for the higher level stages.
Stages 3 and above are based on a modular framework of code modules. These modules offer functions through
a private, custom interface. Each file in stages 3 and above can “export” functionality to other parts of Regin.
In the case of Stage 3, the following primitives are offered:
• The orchestrator, which parses custom records found in the appended data of the executable files for stages
3 and above. These records contain a list of Regin functionalities to be executed. A record starts with the
number 0xD912FEAB (little-endian ordering)
• Compression and decompression routines
• Encryption and decryption routines
• Routines to retrieve storage locations of higher-level (Stage 4) components
• Routines to handle an encrypted virtual file system used by Stage 4
• Network primitives
These primitives are provided through a custom export methodology.
Export methodology
The Stage 3 DLL exports a wide range
Table 2. An example of Regin’s methods organized into 12 groups
of functionality through a custom
export methodology. The interface used
Major Functionality
to export functionality does not make
0001h Core
use of the traditional Windows DLL
export mechanism by name or ordinal.
000Dh Compression, decompression
000Fh Encryption, decryption
Exported Regin methods are referenced
by a tuple consisting of a major
003Dh EVFS handling
and minor number. Stage 3 exports
0007h Container management
hundreds of methods, organized
into 12 different major groups. The
000Bh Log management
numbers used vary across versions. We
0033h Loader
acquired artifacts using two different
0011h Network
numbering schemes. Table 2 is an
example listing.
0013h Network
C373h TCP command-and-control (C&C)
With Regin’s modular nature, Stage
4 kernel modules and Stage 5 user
0019h UDP C&C
modules (payloads) can provide
0009h C&C Processor
functionality and export routines using
the same major and minor numbering
scheme.
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Stage 4
The files for Stage 4, which are loaded by Stage 3, consist of a user-mode orchestrator and multiple kernel
payload modules. They are stored in two EVFS containers as files:
• %System%configSystemAudit.Evt: Contains Stage 4 kernel drivers, which constitute the kernel mode part of
Regin’s payload.
• %System%configSecurityAudit.Evt: Contains a user mode version of Stage 3. The files are injected into
services.exe.
When the attackers who operated Regin cleaned up compromised computers once they were finished with them,
they often failed to remove Stage 4 and 5 artifacts from the system.
Stage 4 also uses the same export methodology described in Stage 3.
Stage 5
Stage 5 consists of the main Regin payload functionality. The files for Stage 5 are injected into services.exe by
Stage 4.
Stage 5 files are EVFS containers containing other files:
• %System%configSystemLog.evt: Contains Stage 5 user mode DLLs. They constitute Regin’s payload.
• %System%configSecurityLog.evt: Contains Stage 5 data files, used by the Stage 4 and 5 components to
store various data items
• %System%configApplicationLog.evt: Another Stage 5 log container, which is
referenced by Stage 5 data files
• %Windir%imeimesc5dictspintlgbp.imd (version 2.0)
• %Windir%imeimesc5dictspintlgbs.imd (version 2.0)
Regin’s payload involves the DLLs contained in the SystemLog.evt EVFS container.
The payload functionality differs depending on the targeted computer. Custom
payload files will likely be delivered for each specific environment. Example payload
functionality seen to date includes:
• Sniffing low-level network traffic
• Exfiltrating data through various channels (TCP, UDP, ICMP, HTTP)
• Gathering computer information
• Stealing passwords
• Gathering process and memory information
• Crawling through the file system
• Low level forensics capabilities (for example, retrieving files that were deleted)
• UI manipulation (remote mouse point & click activities, capturing screenshots, etc.)
• Enumerating IIS web servers and stealing logs
• Sniffing GSM BSC administration network traffic
Encrypted virtual file system containers
Regin stores data files and payloads on disk in encrypted virtual file system files. Such
files are accessed by the major routines 3Dh. Files stored inside EVFS containers are
encrypted with a variant of RC5, using 64-bit blocks and 20 rounds. The encryption
mode is reverse cipher feedback (CFB).
Known extensions for EVFS containers are *.evt and *.imd. The structure of a
container is similar to the FAT file system. One major difference is that files do
not have a name; instead, they’re identified using a binary tag. The tag itself is the
Figure 4. Physical layout
of an EVFS container

concatenation of a major number and a minor number. The major number typically indicates the major function
group that will handle the file.
A container starts with the header in Table 3
(little-endian ordering).
Table 3. The container’s header
Offset Type Description
The header is followed by the file entry table
(Table 4). Each file entry is 13h+taglen bytes
00h WORD Sector size in bytes
long.
02h WORD Maximum sector count
The sectors follow (Table 5). A sector of
04h WORD Maximum file count
sectsize bytes starts with a DWORD pointing to
06h BYTE File tag length (taglen)
the next sector (if the file does not fit within a
single sector), followed by sectsize-4 bytes of
07h DWORD Header CRC
payload data.
0Bh DWORD File table CRC
As explained above, the files are encrypted.
0Fh WORD Number of files
Other layers of encryption and compression
11h WORD Number of sectors in use
may also be in place, although those would be
handled by higher level components.
13h - Sector-use bitmap
Command-and-control
operations
Table 4. The container’s file entry table
00h DWORD CRC
04h DWORD File offset
08h DWORD Offset to first sector holding the file data
0Ch BYTE[taglen] File tag
Regin’s C&C operations are extensive. These
backchannel operations are bidirectional,
which means either the attackers can initiate
communications with compromised computers
on the border network or the compromised
computers can initiate communications with
the attacker. Furthermore, compromised
computers can serve as a proxy for other
Table 5. The container’s sectors
infections and command and control can
also happen in a peer-to-peer fashion. All
communications are strongly encrypted and
00h DWORD Next sector offset, or 0
can happen in a two-stage fashion where the
04h BYTE[sectsize-4] Data
attacker may contact a compromised computer
using one channel to instruct it to begin
communications on a different channel. Four transport protocols are available for C&C:
• ICMP: Payload information can be encoded and embedded in lieu of legitimate ICMP/ping data. The string
‘shit’ is scattered in the packet for data validation. In addition, CRC checks use the seed ‘31337’.
• UDP: Raw UDP payload
• TCP: Raw TCP payload
• HTTP: Payload information can be encoded and embedded within cookie data under the names SESSID,
SMSWAP, TW, WINKER, TIMESET, LASTVISIT, AST.NET_SessionId, PHPSESSID, or phpAds_d. This information
can be combined with another cookie for validation under the names USERIDTK, UID, GRID, UID=PREF=ID, TM,
__utma, LM, TMARK, VERSION, or CURRENT
The C&C operations are undertaken by various modules, including major groups C373h, 19h, 9, as well as Stage
5 payloads, such as C375h and 1Bh.
Logging
Regin logs data to the ApplicationLog.dat file. This file is not an encrypted container, but it is encrypted and
compressed.
Page 12

The extensible
nature of Regin and
its custom payloads
indicate that many
payloads are likely
to exist in order to
enhance Regin’s
capabilities...
PAYLOADS

Page 14
Payloads
Regin can be distributed with various payload modules or receive payload modules after infection. The
extensible nature of Regin and its custom payloads indicate that many additional payloads are likely to exist in
order to enhance Regin’s capabilities. Furthermore, we have found data files accompanying payload modules
that have not been recovered. The following table describes the Stage 4 kernel payload modules and Stage 5
user mode payload modules, which we have seen several variants of Regin use.
Table 6. Regin’s stage 4 kernel payload modules and stage 5 user mode payload modules
File type Major Description
SYS 0003 Driver
SYS C433 Rootkit
SYS C42B PE loader
SYS C42D DLL injection
SYS C3C3 Network packet filter driver similar to the WinPCap (protocol filter version 3.5)
Used to set TCP and UDP pass-through filters and to bypass firewalls.
Executes BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) bytecode, stored in Stage 5 data files.
SYS 4E69 Network port blocker
DLL C363 Network packet capture
DLL 4E3B Retrieve proxy information for a web browser (Internet Explorer, Netscape, Firefox) through registry or configu-ration
files (for example, prefs.js, refs.js, etc.) Enumerate sessions and user accounts
DLL 290B Password stealer
• Windows Explorer credentials
• Windows Explorer pstore records
• Internet Explorer LegacySettings
• Data for a Winlogon notification package named “cryptpp”
DLL C375 C&C HTTP/cookies
DLL C383 SSL communications
DLL C361 Supporting cryptography functions
DLL 001B ICMP backchannel
DLL C399 Record builder for ApplicationLog.Evt
DLL C39F Processes file: %Temp%~b3y7f.tmp
DLL C3A1 Miscellaneous functions
DLL 28A5 Miscellaneous functions
DLL C3C1 Miscellaneous functions
DLL C3B5 Gather system information
• CPUMemory
• Drives and shares
• Devices
• Windows information (including type, version, license info, owner info)
• Installed software
• Running processes (through HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA id 230)
• Services
• Schedules tasks and jobs
• Running desktop sessions
• User accounts information
• System’s auditing rules/policy
• System time and Windows install time

DLL C36B UI manipulation
• Capture screenshots
• Log keystrokes
• Lock the workstation/input Ctrl-Alt-Del
• Click functionality (through three commands: go, click & release, return to original position)
• End processes
DLL C351 File system exploration primitives and forensic level exploration including a raw NTFS parser
• Get miscellaneous file information and properties
• Browse directories
• Read and write files
• Move and copy files
• Read and recover partially or fully deleted files
• Compute file hashes
DLL 2B5D Process and module manipulation
• Read processes and modules
• Processes running times, quotas, privileges
• Skip Russian or English Microsoft files when scanning
• Check for newly introduced PE files in the last two days
DLL C3CD Enumerate TCP/IP interfaces from %System%CurrentControlSetServicesTcpipLinkagebind
DLL C38F TCPDump utility
DLL C3C5 Libnet binary
DLL 27E9 IIS web server log theft
Enumeration through COM objects to find IIS logs. Ability to retrieve partial or complete log information.
• Partial: Log type, last log, older log timestamps
• Complete: Entire log data is exfiltrated
The IIS web server log stealing module, 27E9h, is an example of a payload module that was installed after the initial
infection and was specifically deployed for a particular target.
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64-bit version
Only a small amount of the 64-bit Regin files have been recovered. These samples may represent version 2.0 or
their differences may possibly be solely specific to 64-bit versions of Regin. We also recovered files from infected
computers that may or may not be associated with 64-bit Regin, including several variants of svcsstat.exe, a file that
aims to retrieve binary data over pipes or sockets and execute the data.
File names
The recovered files do not appear to fundamentally vary from their 32-bit counterparts, apart from a few noteworthy
differences.
The 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Regin use different file names. These differences are shown in the first section of
this paper as well as in the appendix. Most importantly, in the 64-bit version of Regin, the names of containers are
changed:
• PINTLGBP.IMD replaces SystemLog.Evt
• PINTLGBPS.IMD replaces SecurityLog.Evt
Stage differences
The 64-bit version of Regin’s Stage 1 (wshnetc.dll) is no longer a kernel mode driver, as drivers under 64-bit Windows
must be signed. Instead, Stage 1 is a user mode DLL loaded as a Winsock helper when the computer is starting
up. Rather than loading Stage 2 from an NTFS extended attribute, Stage 1 looks for the last partition (in terms of

physical location) on disk and searches for the payload in the raw sectors in this area of the disk.
The 64-bit Regin’s Stage 3 has not been recovered. We believe that it may not exist, as the 32-bit version is a driver.
Stage 4 is an orchestrator just like its 32-bit counterpart and it uses the same major and minor values to export
functionality.
Stage 5 uses the following filenames:
• %Windir%IMEIMESC5DICTSPINTLGBP.IMD contains Stage 5 user payloads, replacing SystemLog.Evt in the
32-bit version
• %Windir%IMEIMESC5DICTSPINTLGBS.IMD contains Stage 5 data files, replacing SecurityLog.Evt in the 32-bit
version
• The equivalent files for SystemAudit.Evt and SecurityAudit.Evt were not recovered
No Stage 5 payload modules have been recovered.
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Conclusion
Regin is a highly-complex threat which has been used for large-scale data collection or intelligence gathering
campaigns. The development and operation of this threat would have required a significant investment of time
and resources. Threats of this nature are rare and are only comparable to the Stuxnet/Duqu family of malware.
The discovery of Regin serves to highlight how significant investments continue to be made into the development
of tools for use in intelligence gathering. Many components of Regin have still gone undiscovered and additional
functionality and versions may exist.
Protection
Regin components are detected as Backdoor.Regin.

Page 18
Appendix
Data files
Regin’s data files are classified as Stage 5 components and are contained in an EVFS container.
Table 7. Data files used by Stage 4’s framework DLL
Major Minor Description
0001 - -
000D - -
000F 01 High-entropy blobs, cryptographic data
02 High-entropy blobs, cryptographic data
003D - -
0007 - -
000B 01 Contains a path to the log file.
Typically, %SystemconfigApplicationLog.Evt
02 Small 8 byte files
0033 01 A single DWORD, such as 111Ch
03 A single DWORD, such as 1114h
0011 - -
0013 01 Unknown list of records
02 A single byte, such as 3
C373 01 BPF bytecode for the netpcap driver—allows UDP passthrough
02 A WORD value, such as 1
0019 01 BPF bytecode for the netpcap driver—allows TCP passthrough
02 A WORD value, such as 1
0009 00 A single DWORD, such as 11030B15h
01 Contains C&C location information
02 C&C routines to be executed:
• (C375, 1) param= 08 02
• (19, 1) param= 44 57 58 00
• (C373, 1) param= 08 02
• (1B, 1) param= 20 00
03 Routines to be executed
• (4E69, 2)
• (19, 2)
• (1B, 2)
• (C373, 2)(
• C375, 2)
• (C383, 2)(C363, 2)
07 RC5 key used to decrypt command-and-control packets
09 Unknown data
0B Unknown data
12 A single byte, such as 1
17 Unknown data

As the data files are stored in a container, they do
not have names. Just like Stage 5 modules, they are
referenced by their filetag, which is the aggregation
of the major and minor identifiers. The major
identifier indicates which major routine group likely
handles or creates the file.
Not all data files have been recovered, so the
information remains incomplete.
Data files associated with Stage 4 kernel modules
have not been recovered
Table 8 lists recovered data files used by Stage 5
modules.
The associated modules that supposedly
manipulate those data files were not recovered.
Table 8. Data files used by Stage 5’s modules (payloads)
C363 02 6 bytes (01 00 00 00 00 00)
4E3B -
290B -
C375 01 Dword (1)
Page 19
02 Dword (0)
C383 01 Dword (1)
02 Dword (0)
10 64 bytes (512 bits)Diffie Hellman, p (prime)
11 Byte (2)Diffie Hellman, g (generator)
C361 10 File containing timestamps and high
entropy dataUnclear
11 Dword (E10h)
12 Dword (2)
001B -
C399 -
C39F 00 Small file, 18h bytes, low entropy
01 Unencrypted unicode path,
%Temp%~B3Y7F.tmp
C3A1 01 Small file, 6 bytes (08 01 00 00 00 01)
28A5 02 Small file, 18h bytes, unknown
C3C1 - -
C3B5 - -
C36B - -
C351 - -
2B5D - -
C3CD - -
C38F - -
C3C5 - -
27E9 - -
Table 9. Orphaned data files
4E25 00 Byte (1)
01 Byte (2)
28A4 00 Unknown
02 Small file, 8 bytes (01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00)
DEAB 01 Small file, 8 bytes (00 00 01 01 04 00 00 00)

Page 20
Indicators of compromise
The following details can be used to help determine whether you have been impacted by this threat.
File MD5s
2c8b9d2885543d7ade3cae98225e263b
4b6b86c7fec1c574706cecedf44abded
187044596bc1328efa0ed636d8aa4a5c
06665b96e293b23acc80451abb413e50
d240f06e98c8d3e647cbf4d442d79475
6662c390b2bbbd291ec7987388fc75d7
ffb0b9b5b610191051a7bdf0806e1e47
b29ca4f22ae7b7b25f79c1d4a421139d
1c024e599ac055312a4ab75b3950040a
ba7bb65634ce1e30c1e5415be3d1db1d
b505d65721bb2453d5039a389113b566
b269894f434657db2b15949641a67532
bfbe8c3ee78750c3a520480700e440f8
File names/paths
usbclass.sys
adpu160.sys
msrdc64.dat
msdcsvc.dat
%System%configSystemAudit.Evt
%System%configSecurityAudit.Evt
%System%configSystemLog.evt
%System%configApplicationLog.evt
%Windir%imeimesc5dictspintlgbs.imd
%Windir%imeimesc5dictspintlgbp.imd
%Windir%system32winhttpc.dll
%Windir%system32wshnetc.dll
%Windir%SysWow64wshnetc.dll
%Windir%system32svcstat.exe

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%Windir%system32svcsstat.exe
Extended attributes
%Windir%
%Windir%cursors
%Windir%fonts
%Windir%System32
%Windir%System32drivers
Registry
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlClass{4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-
D0204917CA58}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlRestoreListVideoBase
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlClass{4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-
D0204917CA5A}

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1982, Symantec, a Fortune 500 company, operating one of
the largest global data-intelligence networks, has provided
leading security, backup and availability solutions for where
vital information is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s
more than 21,500 employees reside in more than 50 countries.
Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion.
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Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
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